Speed Limit Signs should be visible to the Driver
Coombes v Director of Public Prosecutions - Queen's Bench Divisional Court - December 14, 2006
For a motorist to be convicted of speeding, it was a requirement that the relevant road signs could reasonably be expected to indicate the limit to an approaching driver in sufficient time for him to reduce from a previous lawful speed to a speed within the new limit.
Sentencing for Causing Death by Dangerous Driving
R v Richardson and others [2006] EWCA Crim 3186. This case details how the guideline case of R v Cooksley should be applied to cases of causing death by dangerous driving, or driving whilst under the influence of drink or drugs, given that the statutory maximums for those offences have now been increased. "In the present appeals the main argument between Mr Nicholas Hilliard on behalf of the Attorney General and Mr Camden Pratt QC on behalf of Richardson, (whose argument was adopted on behalf of the remaining appellants), was whether the increases effected by section 285 of the 2003 Act should normally lead to increased sentences throughout the entire range of the offences covered by the increased maximum, or whether increases should be directed at cases of the greatest culpability, which have caused the greatest harm. The second area addressed by counsel required us to reflect on the relationship between causing death by dangerous driving and causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink. To date they have been treated, in effect, as if they were virtually identical. The Crown's contention on what we have described as the main argument is simple enough. The increase in the maximum sentence was intended to reflect the broad view of Parliament that sentencing courts should approach these offences with greater severity than before. That would produce a greater effect in the more rather than the less serious cases, but nevertheless would have some impact throughout the range of sentences.
The relevant starting points identified in Cooksley should be reassessed as follows:
i) No aggravating circumstances – twelve months to two years' imprisonment (previously 18 months);
ii) Intermediate culpability - two to four and a half years' imprisonment (previously 3 years);
iii) Higher culpability – four and a half to seven years' imprisonment (previously 5 years);
iv) Most serious culpability – seven to fourteen years' imprisonment (previous starting point of 6 years).
In relation to causing death when under the influence, the new guidelines are:
The maximum sentence for causing death by dangerous driving, or causing death having consumed excess alcohol is identical. The natural implication is that they are equated in seriousness. If the level of impairment is only just in excess of the permitted limit, and the driving is otherwise careless rather than dangerous in the sense outlined in this judgment, the consumption of alcohol provides the most significant aggravating element of the offence. If there are no others, it will normally fall within the category of offences of causing death by dangerous driving which lack any additional aggravating features. As the consumption of alcohol increases, so does the relative culpability, and by the time the consumption is at or about double the legal limit, the case would fall within the intermediate category. At higher levels than this, in the vast majority of cases, there is a correlation between amount of alcohol consumed and significantly reduced standards of driving. In the vast majority of these cases, some distinct elements of culpability in the driving itself, identified as aggravating features in Cooksley, are almost inevitable. At these sorts of levels, the result will be dangerous driving of a kind which will take the case into the categories of higher culpability and then most serious culpability. In short, we do not envisage many cases where the alcohol level reaches three times the permitted limit, and the driving itself will be no worse than careless driving. However even if it were not dangerous in this sense, at these and higher levels the sentencing decision would normally fall within the two most serious categories of culpability.
Mitgiation:
We must expressly consider two matters of mitigation. A timely plea of guilty was identified in Cooksley as a mitigating factor. This issue has now been addressed in the definitive guideline issued by the Sentencing Guidelines Council in December 2004, "Reduction in sentence for a guilty plea". This guideline in its present form, or if amended in its amended form, applies to the offences presently under consideration. We therefore suggest that where there is a guilty plea, the sentencing judge should reach his preliminary conclusion as the appropriate sentence level before taking account of and applying the discount for the guilty plea. Just as care must be taken to avoid double accounting of aggravating features, similar care needs to be taken against double accounting for mitigating features. The second feature which struck us during the hearing of these cases is that it is plainly an aggravating feature of the offence that the defendant behaved irresponsibly at the time of the offence. In our judgement, however, it is a specific mitigating feature, not expressly identified in the guideline, that the defendant behaved responsibly, and took positive action to assist at the scene. It is not a mitigating feature that he merely waited or remained at the scene: we have in mind direct action to assist the victim or victims of his driving. "
